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Merrill Lynch v. Dabit: Federal
Preemption of Holders' Class Actions
By Mark J. Loewenstein*
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 1 the U.S. Supreme Court decided a seemingly narrow question of statutory interpretation, yet made a significant statement about federal-state jurisdiction in
securities litigation. At issue was whether the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 19982 (SLUSA) prohibits the maintenance of a
class action under state law alleging that the defendant fraudulently induced the plaintiff class to hold - as opposed to purchase or sell- certain
securities. The Court held that it did, thus ending the litigation. While the
Court had sound reasons for reaching this conclusion, there were also
strong arguments leaning in the other direction. In the end, the Court
chose an outcome that furthered a trend in its securities law jurisprudence
limiting the role of state law. This article analyzes the Dabit decision,
both on its on terms and in the context of the Court's recent decisions in
the securities law area.

I.

The Litigation
Dab it arose out of the scandal surrounding analysts' reports issued by
the country's leading investment banks. This case, and others, alleged
that those reports fraudulently induced investors to hold the subject securities; if the truth had been told, the investors allegedly would have sold.
The complaints also alleged that investment banks encouraged such
fraudulent reports to enhance their ability to attract investment banking
business from the reported-on companies. 3 On these facts, the investors
could not maintain actions under Rule 10b-5, because they did not purchase or sell. securities on the basis of fraudulent statements, as required
by the 1975 Supreme Court decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores. 4 So, foreclosed from a federal cause of action, the investors in
Dabit filed state law claims alleging breach of fiduciary duty and breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 5
*Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School, Boulder, Colorado. The author thanks
Michael Delcour for his valuable research assistance.
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A class action alleging state law claims in the securities law area, however, implicates SLUSA. Passed by Congress in 1998, this Act was designed to close a loophole that had developed under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 6 (the Reform Act). The Reform Act was
intended to limit securities class actions by imposing various substantive
and procedural requirements on such actions. 7 As a result of the Reform
Act, securities class action litigation began to migrate to state courts, or
allege state claims in federal diversity actions. 8 By filing state law actions, plaintiffs were able to avoid the onerous requirements of the Reform Act. In response, Congress passed SLUSA, providing that no "covered class actions" may be maintained under state law. 9 In short, and subject to certain exceptions, covered class actions are those that allege fraud
in connection with the purchase or sale of a publicly traded security. 10
In Dabit, the defendants sought to dismiss the complaint on the basis
that it was preempted by SLUSA and therefore could not be maintained
under state law, even as a diversity action in federal court. 11 The district
court agreed, 12 but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, 13 holding that because the complaint did not allege that plaintiffs
were fraudulently induced to purchase or sell securities, the cause of action was not preempted by SLUSA. Put differently, in the view of the appellate court, a "holders" class action may be maintained notwithstanding
the broad preemptive reach of SLUSA.
Thus, the narrow issue before the Supreme Court was how to read the
provision in SLUSA that preempted class actions alleging fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security." 14 Literally, plaintiffs were not claiming that they were defrauded in buying or selling any
security, but rather that they were defrauded by being induced not to
sell. 15 Moreover, because Blue Chip Stamps held that Rule 1Ob-5 does
not provide a remedy to those who are dissuaded from purchasing or selling a security, plaintiffs argued that if they could not maintain a class action under state law, they could not maintain a class action at all. 16
Although these arguments persuaded the appellate court, the Supreme
Court was unmoved. 17 Instead, the Court opted for a broad, non-literal
reading of the "purchase and sale" requirement of SLUSA, thereby expanding the reach of that legislation. 18 In so doing, the Court clarified the
meaning of Blue Chip Stamps, describing it as a case that merely limited
standing to maintain a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5. 19 Of
equal importance, the Court said that Blue Chip Stamps was based on
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policy considerations, not an interpretation of statutory language. 20 By so
cabining Blue Chip Stamps, the Court answered the argument that the
phrase "purchase or sale" must mean the same thing in Rule 1Ob-5 as it
does in SLUSA. The Court essentially said that the phrase does mean the
same thing in both provisions; because Blue Chip Stamps only deals with
standing for private damage actions and not statutory interpretation, that
precedent is not to the contrary.
One problem faced by the Dabit Court was whether the phrase "purchase and sale," as employed in SLUSA, has such a plain meaning that the
Court could reach a different result through interpretation. Interestingly, the
Court did not even consider the potential "plain meaning" of the term, despite ample precedents that suggest that plain meaning is the first inquiry in
statutory interpretation. 21 Of even greater interest is the fact that Justices
Scalia and Thomas, who have frequently chided the Court for ignoring the
plain meaning of statutes or the Constitution, did not write separately in
this case to address this lurking plain meaning problem.Z2
Eschewing, at least implicitly, the plain meaning rule, the Court instead relied on its decisions that gave a broad meaning to Rule 10b-5.23
The Court cited Superintendent of Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life
& Casualty Co., 24 SEC v. Zandford, 25 and United States v. O'Hagan 26 as
cases that demonstrate that "it is enough that the fraud alleged 'coincide'
with a securities transaction-whether by the plaintiff or by someone
else."27 Only the first of these, however, was a private damage action. In
the latter two cases, which are discussed in section III below, the Court
was not faced with the interpretation question faced here. The Court decided that where there is a sufficient link betWeen a securities transaction
- a purchase or sale - and the fraud, an action may be maintained under
Rule 10b-5. Superintendent of Insurance, a truly inscrutable decision,
stands for the same proposition. But all of this begs the question, which is
whether the fraud alleged in Dabit would constitute a violation of Rule
1Ob-5. In other words, if those who were defrauded consisted solely of
holders, would the SEC have jurisdiction to maintain an enforcement action under Rule 1Ob-5 (or the Department of Justice a criminal prosecution under the Rule)? No precedent has so held, although Dabit now
stands for just that proposition.
The Court thus concludes that because its precedents construed Rule
10b-5 broadly, and Blue Chip Stamps only decided who has standing to
maintain a private damage action, Congress must have intended that the
phrase "purchase and sell" have the same meaning in SLUSA as in the
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Supreme Court's Rule 10b-5 cases (other than Blue Chip Stamps). 28
While there is some force to this approach, it has two problems. First,
none of these cases turned on the meaning of "purchase and sale," and
second, Blue Chip Stamps was not as policy-based as the Court suggested. The latter point is addressed in the next section.

II.

Blue Chip Stamps Revisited

Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous court in Dabit, 29 characterized Blue Chip Stamps as a case "[r]elying principally on 'policy considerations."'30 One might take issue with this characterization. While Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the majority opinion for a divided court, 31 did
discuss why denying standing to the plaintiff class in Blue Chip Stamps
was sound policy, the opinion may not rest "primarily" on policy considerations.32 For starters, Rehnquist's opinion cites an earlier, widely adopted opinion by the Second Circuit, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 33
which did not consider policy at all in concluding that Rule 10b-5 provided a remedy only to purchasers and sellers of securities. Indeed the Birnbaum court correctly saw Rule 10b-5 as filling a gap in the anti-fraud
coverage of the federal securities laws, because section 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibited fraud in connection with the sale of securities, but no provision expressly prohibited fraud in connection with the
purchase of securities. To cover this gap, the Securities and Exchange
Commission adopted Rule 1Ob-5 pursuant to its rulemaking authority under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.
Second, Justice Rehnquist relied on Congressional determinations in
1957 and 1959 to decline the invitation of the SEC to broaden section
1O(b) to cover "any attempt to purchase or sell . . . any security."34 Such
reliance is similar to relying on legislative history, but quite dissimilar
from a policy-based analysis. Finally, the Justice carefully analyzed the
"Congressional scheme"35 of the federal securities laws to support the
holding. This scheme clearly indicated Congress's intent that "purchase
and sale" be read literally: "It would indeed be anomalous to impute to
Congress an intention to expand the plaintiff class for a judicially implied
cause of action beyond the bounds it delineated for comparable express
causes of action." 36 Only after all of the foregoing analysis did Justice
Rehnquist turn to policy considerations.
Indeed, rather than characterize policy considerations as of primary concern, one might view Blue Chip Stamps as a case in which policy considerations merely added weight to a holding supported on other bases. Justice
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Stevens, however, faced a dilemma by viewing Blue Chip Stamps in this
light. If Blue Chip Stamps rested on a narrow interpretation of section 1O(b),
and since Congress used the same language in SLUSA, the latter statute must
have the same meaning. To avoid this dilemma, Justice Stevens had to characterize Blue Chip Stamps as resting on policy considerations.
Blue Chip Stamps was not, however, the only obstacle which the Court
faced in Dabit. Giving an expansive reading to SLUSA meant narrowing
the freedom of the states to provide a class action remedy. The Court recognized this: "In concluding that SLUSA pre-empts state-law holder
class-action claims of the kind alleged in Dabit's complaint, we do not
lose sight of the general 'presum[ption] that Congress does not cavalierly
pre-empt state-law causes of action.'" 37
While the Court responded to this argument, noting that SLUSA "does
not actually pre-empt any state cause of action ... [because] [i]t simply
denies plaintiffs the right to use the class action device to vindicate certain claims,"38 there is another aspect of preemption, or at least federalism, that should have been considered. That aspect is discussed in the
next section.

III.
The Federalism Concern
Dabit is now the fifth case decided under the federal securities laws
since 1997 that has had the effect of displacing state law. 39 In the first of
these, United States v. 0 'Hagan, 40 the Court endorsed the misappropriation theory under Rule 1Ob-5. As a result, it is a crime under the federal
securities laws for a person to purchase securities on the basis of information entrusted to him about the issuer of those securities unless the provider of the information consents to such use. 41 Such misuse, or misappropriation, of confidential information is a fraud in connection with the
purchase of securities because the purchaser "defrauded" the provider of
the information, and did so in connection with a securities transaction. 42
Thus, what might otherwise be characterized, and treated, as a state law ·
breach of fiduciary duty has become, under 0 'Hagan, a federal crime.
While the states could conceivably regulate such conduct, the incentive to
do so, and the normal range of options that a state might consider, are
mooted by the 0 'Hagan decision.
Following O'Hagan, the Court decided Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United International Holdings, Inc., 43 which, like 0 'Hagan, was a decision
that federalized an area of common law. Wharf involved the question of
whether a contracting party's failure to disclose its intent not to honor an
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oral commitment to sell stock to the plaintiff under certain agreed-upon
circumstances constituted fraud under Rule lOb-5. 44 The Court thus had
to decide whether an oral option (as it characterized the parties' agreement) was a security and whether the defendant's "secret reservation"
amounted to an actionable misrepresentation. 45 The Court decided both
issues in favor of the plaintiff.46 Thus, a transaction that, on its face, appears to be a simple common law breach of contract, was transformed by
the Court into a federal cause of action. Whether this area of law, traditionally relegated to the states, should as a matter of policy fall under the
federal securities laws did not merit any comment from the Court.
A year after Wharf, the Court followed the same tack in SEC v. Zandford, 47 a case involving a theft by a broker from his customers' brokerage
account. On its face, the defendant's conduct is a classic example of
breach of fiduciary duty and common law theft. The SEC, however,
sought a remedy under Rule lOb-5, arguing that the defendant's theft was
"in connection with the purchase and sale" of a security and, therefore, in
violation of the Rule. 48 The Supreme Court, reversing the Fourth Circuit,
agreed. 49 Citing 0 'Hagan, the Court took an expansive view of the "in
connection with" language and concluded that the scheme to misappropriate the proceeds of the sale of securities was enough to satisfy the requirements of the Rule. 5° As in Wharf, the Court took an aggressive view
of the reach of the federal securities laws, and enlarged the jurisdiction of
the SEC. The transaction in Zandford, like that in Wharf, had no effect on
integrity of the securities markets and thus there was little reason to bring
it within federal securities laws. 51
The fourth case decided by the Court, SEC v. Edwards, 52 fits neatly
into this pattern as well. Edwards involved the definition of a security, in
this case a sale of payphones to investors with ancillary agreements that
essentially assigned to the promoters the responsibility of managing the
phones and promised the investors a fixed return. 53 The Court ruled that
transaction amounted to security under the definition announced in SEC
v. W.J. Howey 54 for an investment contract: "an investment of money in a
common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others."55 The Court's opinion does not, however, consider whether, in fact,
there was a common enterprise. The facts in Edwards may not satisfy the
prevailing concepts of common enterprise - that there must be horizontal
commonality where the investors' money is pooled. 56 Judge Lay, of the
Fourth Circuit, who concurred in the appellate court's decision in Ed-
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wards, observed that there was no pooling of funds. 57 Removing horizontal commonality from the definition of an investment contract would expand the definition of a security and, thus, the reach of the federal securities laws. As in 0 'Hagan and Zandford, what would otherwise be garden
variety state law claims are now federal securities law violations.
The final and most recent case decided by the Court before Dabit,
Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 58 seemingly does not fit this pattern.
On close examination, however, it may. Dura decided what constitutes
"loss causation" in a Rule 10b-5 action. 59 The plaintiff had alleged that
misrepresentations made by the corporate defendant had artificially inflated the purchase price for the company's stock and that plaintiff thus
suffered a loss at the time of purchase. 60 The Court, reversing the Ninth
Circuit, held that loss causation requires more than just purchasing stock
at an inflated price. Rather, the Court suggested that the complaint should
"claim that Dura's share price fell significantly after the truth became
known ...." 61 Interestingly, the Court grounded this conclusion on its
view of the common law, 62 thus preserving the link between Rule 1Ob-5
actions and common law fraud. 63
The common law basis for Dura's conclusion is not beyond question.
As an initial matter, common law cases do support the plaintiff's argument that paying an inflated price constitutes a loss 64 and no less an authority than the Supreme Court itself so determined. In Sigafus v. Porter65
the Court accepted the common law proposition that loss causation is determined by calculating the difference between the purchase price of the
security and the "true" value of the security at the time of purchase. 66 The
Court supported its holding in Sigafus with an English common law precedent. 67 Other precedents, 68 and common sense, support the notion that
a person suffers a loss at the time of purchase. The stock may never decline in value, even a:fter the truth of the misrepresentation is disclosed,
because other factors caused the stock to increase. Yet plaintiff can still
claim a loss because, had the truth been known when he purchased the
stock, the total increase in value that the plaintiff realized would have
been greater.
There are, to be sure, precedents that support the Court's view of loss causation. 69 But to a large extent these cases and, indeed, Dura itself, represent
an adaptation of the elements of common law to a Rule 1Ob-5 action involving publicly-traded securities. As a matter of policy, not necessarily common
law, proof of loss causation may require that plaintiff allege more than pur-
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chase-time loss. On the other hand, it seems unjust, and unprecedented, to
hold a purchaser of stock in a nonpublic company to the same standard. 70 In
that instance, subsequent disclosure will not provide the critical evidence of
plaintiff's loss; that disclosure will only constitute some sort of notice to
plaintiff that it has a claim for a loss incurred at the time of purchase. One perverse effect of Dura may be to alter the common law view of loss causation in
fraudulent misrepresentation cases. 71 At best, however, Rule 1Ob-5 is further
unmoored from the state law concepts of fraud from which it emanated.

rv.

Conclusion
While one can quibble with the Court's reasoning and the parsing of its
precedents, Dabit is by no means an unprecedented or unreasoned decision. The Court is surely correct that Congress sought to limit securities
class action litigation based on state law and, we can safely speculate,
would have approved of language incorporating the result in Dabit. Moreover, holders' actions are, by their very nature, troubling class actions. The
Court was correct, as was the Court in Blue Chip Stamps, to note the large
potential for abuse in these sorts of class actions. Plaintiffs with strong cases can, as the Court noted, maintain their action as· individual actions (or
joined with up to 49 others) under state law. What they are deprived of is
the special leverage that a class action gives to the plaintiff class. From a
public policy perspective, that's not such a bad thing.
What is troubling about Dabit, and the Court's other recent precedents
in the area of the federal securities laws, is the short shrift that these cases
give to state law. The Court's passing reference to the presumption
against preemption rings hollow; one might reasonably ask whether state
law procedural rules - in this case rules that allowed holders' class actions - should be "cavalierly" pre-empted. Dabit is just another instance
of the declining importance of state ·law in the securities arena.
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U.S. 1039, 99 S. Ct. 642, 58 L.Ed.2d 698 (1978); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334
(2d Cir. 1971); see also Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436-38 (9th Cir.
1987) (defining out-of-pocket expenses). Out-of-pocket losses is also the rule for damages
caused by common law fraud. See First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763,
768 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1079, 115 S. Ct. 728, 130 L.Ed.2d 632 (1995).
Since RICO plaintiffs are only entitled to damages proximately caused by the predicate acts,
American Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606,609, 105 S. Ct. 3291, 3292,
87 L.Ed.2d 437 (1985), and the predicate acts claimed here are for securities fraud, plaintiffs'
RICO damages are identical to their securities fraud damages.
See also Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1987) (collecting
additional authorities on the out-of-pocket rule for damages in Rule lOb-5 actions).
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·

179 U.S. 116 (1900).

Id. at 125 ("[T]he plaintiffs ... were entitled to ... the difference between the real value of
the property at the date of its sale to the plaintiffs and the price paid for it ....")
67

·

·

Id. at 124 (citing Peek v. Derry, 37 L.R.Ch. 541, 591, 594 (1887)).

68

· E.g., Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff, who purchased stock
on the basis of fraudulent misrepresentation that patent had issued when, in fact, it had not, suffers
loss at the time of purchase, even if subsequently the patent does issue, because the company was
more valuable with a patent than merely with the possibility of a patent issuing. Id. at 628. The
court noted: "[ d]amages under § 1O(b) ... usually are the difference between the price of the stock
and its value on the date of the transaction if the full truth were known." I d.

69

· Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 344 (2005) (citing Emergent Capital
Investment Management, LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003). See also
Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2000); Robbins v. Kroger Properties, Inc., 116
F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1997); Restatement (Second) ofTorts, § 548A, cmt. bat 107.
70

7

·

See Pommer, 961 F.2d at 628.

See, e.g., Brandon F. White, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo: Supreme Court Case
Calls Massachusetts Loss Causation Rule Into Question, Boston B. J., March/April 2006, at 18
(indicating that Massachusetts rule on loss causation is inconsistent with federal rule announced
in Dura and, therefore, should be reexamined).
1.

